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The sixteenth century Jesuit philosopher Francisco Suárez has
long been recognized as an important figure in the history of thought.
He stands near the end of a long tradition of scholastic thinkers whose
thought, broadly inspired by Aristotle, had provided the dominant
mode of thinking about philosophical problems in an academic setting
for over three hundred years. In addition, his thought continued to
exert an influence long after his death and long after Descartes
inaugurated the modern era of philosophy.1 In this paper, I want to
discuss the account of internal sensation that he provides in his
massive commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima.2 The notion of an
internal sense was integral to Aristotelian influenced accounts of
cognition for a reason brought out clearly in the following passage
from Thomas Aquinas:
It must be said that sense does not apprehend the essences of
realities, but only their exterior accidents. Likewise, imagination
does not apprehend the essences of realities, but only
likenesses of bodies. The intellect alone, then, apprehends the
essences of realities.3
Suárez echoes this sentiment:
There is a great difference between sense and intellect because
sense stops at (sistere) the cognition of sensible external
accidents. Intellect, however, does not stop there but from the
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cognition of accidents it advances to contemplating those
realities that are concealed (latere) under the accidents. And
therefore it is called “intellect” as from “reading within”4
By demarcating the respective spheres of sensation and intellect in
such a way, both thinkers appear to be causing themselves some real
problems. How, after all, can the intellect know an essence if the
human cognitive apparatus is never in direct contact with such an
essence? Are we risking a view in which the intellect must simply
create an essence from the accidental information with which it works?
To solve such potential problems, both Aquinas and Suárez delineate a
theory in which the internal senses play an essential mediating role
between external sensation of accidents and intellectual knowledge of
essences. For both thinkers, the internal sense is the location of the
phantasms, that is, images (imagines) or likenesses (similitudines) of
a particular sensible object. These phantasms, as we shall see soon,
are required for any intellectual cognition and so their nature and
status in the internal sense power is crucial for any account of internal
sensation.
Now, Aristotle had posited the notion of an internal sense as a
means to bridge the gap between the radically discrete activities of the
external senses and our everyday awareness of the unity of
perception. Moreover, the internal sense was used to explain such
phenomena as dreams, creative imagination and the like. Finally, the
internal sense provided an intermediary that was concomitant with the
activity of intellect and, in fact, necessary for intellectual cognition.5
Subsequent generations of Aristotelian thinkers took up Aristotle’s
comments on the internal sense and elaborated complex schemes of
multiple internal sense powers designed to account for a wide variety
of mental activities.6 My aim in this paper is not to deal with every
aspect of Suárez’s account of internal sensation, however interesting
that might be. Instead I want to focus on two primary issues that were
the subject of great controversy throughout the later middle ages: 1)
the number of the internal senses and 2) the relation of the internal
sense apparatus to both the external senses and the intellect. I hope
to show that his discussion of the internal senses succeeds in its
purpose of accounting for the relation between sense and intellect
within the Aristotelian problematic while at the same time advancing
several rather novel theses concerning the internal senses.
Unfortunately, it would be far beyond the scope of the paper to
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consider all attempts prior to him to enumerate a theory of the
internal senses.7 Accordingly, I shall consider his version of the theory
in some abstraction. The one point of reference I shall use is the one
that Suárez himself thinks is the second most plausible account of
internal sensation available: that of Thomas Aquinas.8

1. The Number and Scope of Internal Sense
Powers
It is well known that Thomas distinguishes four such internal
sense powers: common sense, imagination, the estimative power
(called the cogitative power in humans) and memory. I shall briefly
review his description of each power and then discuss more generally
the significance of his account. The crucial move in his account is the
separation between the common sense on the one hand and
imagination, estimation and memory on the other. The common sense
is the root of the external senses and completes them. Unlike the
individual external senses, which are limited to their own proper
objects, the common sense is able to judge among the various objects
of the proper senses. So, while vision, for example, can judge between
colors, only the common sense can judge that a color is not a sound.
Thus, the actions of the external senses individually flow into the
common sense and the common sense is aware of all the sensory
experiences at one time.9 However, the common sense straddles the
line between external senses and internal senses and, while technically
an internal sense power, it has much more in common with the
external senses than the other internal senses. One way that Thomas
marks the distinction is by refusing to name the product of the activity
of common sense a “phantasm.” The phantasm is the paradigmatic
product and object of the internal sense powers and, moreover, plays
a most important role in intellectual cognition since the agent intellect
“abstracts” the intelligible content, the nature or essence of a reality,
from the phantasm. Without the phantasm, human intellectual
cognition would not be possible.10
The three powers more properly termed internal senses, the
imagination, the estimative/cogitative and memory are clearly
described by Thomas and each has a specific function. Imagination
(imaginatio), sometimes called the phantasy (phantasia), performs
two essential functions: (a) it receives and stores the sense
impressions gathered by the external senses and common sense and
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(b) it joins together otherwise discrete experiences to create new
phantasms such as gold mountains or winged horses. Analogously,
sense memory is retentive of sensory experiences. It differs from
imagination in two basic ways. First, it is responsible for the character
of the past (ratio praeteriti) that our sense experiences can possess.
Second, it is primarily receptive and retentive of a certain type of
experiences, those that result from the estimative/cogitative power.11
This latter power has a peculiar character in that it relates primarily to
sensible qualities that cannot be reduced to one of the five external
sensible qualities. Thus, for example, in animals, the estimative power
senses intentions, or notions, that are agreeable (conveniens) or
disagreeable (disconveniens) or more broadly, dangerous and useful.
While in animals this is the result of a kind of natural instinct, in
humans the cogitative power takes on a function very close to
reasoning. This function of the estimative power is rather curious and
the point is brought out well by the traditional designation of such
sensible features as “insensible” (insensatae). The basic idea here is
that the animal must be sensing something over and above the
sensible accidents readily apparent. A sheep, for example, is not
sensing just the collection of sensible qualities that constitute the
wolf—such accidents as color, shape, and smell—but also the “danger”
present by virtue of the wolf’s presence. The mysterious nature of
these insensible sensations is a problem that worries Suárez. Now, in
addition, to this peculiar function of the estimative power, Thomas
assigns a variety of other operations, that are peculiar to the
estimative power as it exists in human, that is, the cogitative power.
So, for example, it is the cogitative power that apprehends an
individual as an instance of a natural kind and Thomas
is led by this function to call the cogitative power the particular reason
(ratio particularis) pointing to its ability to investigate (inquiro) and
compare (confero). In addition, it is the power responsible for
incidental sensation, that is, the ability to sense the individual as the
subject of all the proper sensible qualities it possesses. So, for
example, in seeing an individual, I sense immediately through my five
senses all the sensible qualities the individual possesses. At the same
time, incidentally, I sense the subject of those sensible qualities. The
extension of the estimative power to include this scope of operations is
possible for Thomas because he believes the cogitative power has an
affinity and nearness (affinitas et propiniquitas) to the intellect.
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Consequently, the cogitative power is, as it were, elevated beyond its
mere estimative functions and includes these additional functions by
reason of its likeness to the intellect. Here we see one of the central
ways in which Thomas tries to elucidate the peculiar status of the
internal senses as intermediaries between the restricted external
senses and the intellect. By attributing quasi-intellective functions to
the cogitative power, Thomas goes a long way towards making the
operation of the intellect less discontinuous from sensory processes
than it might otherwise be.
Now at this point it is important to note that Thomas has
committed himself to the existence of four internal senses and that
three of them are associated with the phantasm, which Thomas
defines as the “likenesses of individuals” (similitudines
individuorum).12 By contrast Suárez argues that in fact there is only
one internal sense power, one that he usually calls “phantasia.”
Suárez’s argument for his thesis takes place in explicit dialogue with
Thomas Aquinas’s account of the internal sense powers. Indeed, as
mentioned above, he admits that Thomas’s position is the second most
plausible theory available, second only to his own. Hence in rejecting
Thomas’s account, he is indirectly, but forcefully, arguing for his own
alternate account.
Suárez begins his discussion of the internal sense by doing a
little vocabulary work. He describes and defnes seven terms
traditionally attributed to the internal senses. These are: 1) common
sense (sensus communis), 2) phantasy (phantasia), 3) imagination
(imaginatio), 4) estimation (aestimatio), 5) cogitation (cogitatio), 6)
memory (memoria), and 7) reminiscence (reminiscentia). What unites
these terms is that they all signify some operation of sense distinct
from the activity of the five external senses.13 The emphasis on
function or operation is important since he will proceed to fix the
referent of each of the traditional terms by providing some functional
role for each term.
Beginning with “common sense,” Suárez tells us that the term is
proper to that operation by which we cognize (cognoscere) all the
proper sensibles of the external senses and are thereby in a position to
judge (discernere) among them. It is typically described as the
common principle or source of the external senses and as well as the
terminus to which the external senses “flow together” (influere).14 By
contrast, “phantasy” (phantasia) refers to the operation whereby we
Vivarium, Vol. 39, No. 1 (2001): pg. 119-158. DOI. This article is © Brill Academic Publishers and permission has been
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Brill Academic Publishers does not grant permission for
this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Brill Academic
Publishers.

5

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

know all sensible objects, including external sensible objects in their
absence. In other words, it conserves the species or images of things
sensed and can know them “abstractively”, that is, when the original
sensible object is no longer present. In this way, phantasy is
contrasted to the common sense, which can know only the species of
objects sensed externally when the objects are present to the external
senses.15 It should be noted that Suárez’s use of the term “abstract” in
the context of discussions about knowledge refers to the absence of an
object only while the correlative term “intuitive,” means only that the
object is present. We should not make the mistake of thinking that one
is mediated by a species while the other is not. Rather all cognitive
operations, whether intuitive or abstractive take place by means of a
species, either sensible or intelligible. So, the common sense, as much
as the phantasy, requires a species for its operation. “Imagination”
(imaginatio) refers to the same operation as phantasy, but adds the
feature of being able to compose and divide sensible objects as well as
to create impossible objects. It is what allows us to be able to think
about such items as gold mountains, Pegasus, and the like.16 So far,
we have been talking about internal sensory activities that are
relatively unproblematic in that they are dependent simply on the
ordinary sensible accidents of external objects. Even in the case of
gold mountains and flying horses, the imagination is simply putting
together prior sensory experiences in new ways. However, the
operation know as “estimation” introduces a new factor into the
internal sensory process. Estimation involves the apprehension of a
sensible object under an aspect such that the sensitive appetite is
moved and directed as a result. It is, for example, what allows animals
to sense objects not just as their sensible accidents present
themselves, but also as agreeable or disagreeable to them, as
something to approach or something to fee.17 The same operation in
humans is customarily given a special term: “cogitation.” While I shall
discuss this operation in more detail below, right now I want to stress
that Suárez, here at the beginning of his discussion, explicitly denies
to the cogitative operation any ability to reason (ratiocinari) or to
judge about particulars. He states:
The cogitative is thought by many to be a certain sensitive
power in humans that can reason concerning particulars and
that can compose and divide, but that power exceeds the limits
of the sensitive part. . . . And therefore “cogitative” means
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nothing more than the interior sensitive power itself discerning
among the agreeable and disagreeable as it exists in a special
way in humans. In this manner it has some greater perfection
because not only is it led by an instinct of nature, but also by
increased knowledge and experience and often, too, it is
directed by reason.18
In denying any intrinsic capacity for reasoning to the cogitative
operation, Suárez makes one of his most important breaks with the
Thomistic tradition. As we saw above, Thomas views the cogitative
power as perhaps the most important of the internal sensory powers
and ascribes to it a broad range of activities, including the sensing of
the particular as an instance of a type. Presumably, it is at this point
that the accidents sensed by the external senses are rendered suitable
for abstracting universal content. It is precisely such a role for the
cogitative power that Suárez denies here. The cogitative power has
access to nothing more than the sensible accidents presented to it by
the actions of the external senses. Moreover, in his discussion of the
functions of estimation and cogitation, he is focusing on the
fundamental fact that there is nothing mysterious transmitted during
the process of sensation. A sheep flees a wolf because the sheep sees,
smells and hears its sensible properties, not because it senses danger
or some other such property in a wolf.
The final two terms used to describe operations of the internal
sense are “memory” (memoria) and “reminiscence” (reminiscentia).
Obviously, we can know the past as past and we experience a sense of
time. Memory is simply what allows us to perform these two
operations. It is also the corresponding “abstractive” operation in
relation to the estimative power, just as the imagination is the
abstractive operation corresponding to the intuitive knowledge of the
common sense. The basic idea is that we can remember objects in
their absence.19 More complexly, “reminiscence” is also used to signify
the memory of past experiences, but it is distinguished from memory,
insofar as its operation is supposedly more complex. Reminiscence
functions discursively and in cooperation with the imagination. While
Suárez accepts that this is a common enough usage, he worries that it
attributes more knowledge to the internal senses than is warranted
and suggests instead that such a knowledge of the past is really the
work of the intellect:

Vivarium, Vol. 39, No. 1 (2001): pg. 119-158. DOI. This article is © Brill Academic Publishers and permission has been
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Brill Academic Publishers does not grant permission for
this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Brill Academic
Publishers.

7

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

Thus I judge that reminiscence chief y arises from the intellect,
at least in relation to reasoning (discursus) and compositions
which are added to intellect. Now, because sense always
accompanies intellect, when the intellect reason through
different places and times the sense also accompanies it. That
inquiry that arises in sense is not a proper reasoning, but is a
kind of succession of apprehension proceeding from one to
another and can be called reminiscence and an operation of
sense dependent on a previous reasoning of the intellect.20
Again, we see his characteristic restriction of the scope of the internal
sense power at work here inasmuch as any complex assessment of the
past or process of reasoning involving past experience is said to be an
intellectual process, albeit one dependent on sense.
I have run through in a brief manner the discussion of the
meaning of terms used to describe internal sensory operations for two
reasons. First, it is important to see that Suárez is fully cognizant of
the variety of teachings concerning the internal senses At the same
time, though, I hope to have made it clear that in his discussion he
refuses to beg any questions about the nature of internal sensation.
He has done no more than recognize common internal sensory
experiences in which humans and higher animals engage. Most
importantly, he has refused to make a simple enough inference from
an operation to a power on which the operation depends. A
characteristic way of arguing for the existence of a separate power of
the soul is to argue that each operation that has a proper object
requires the existence of a distinct power. Thomas Aquinas, for
example, states
A power as such is directed to an act. Therefore we must derive
the nature of the power from the act to which it is directed; and
consequently the nature of a power is differsified according as
the nature of the act is differsified. Now the nature of an act is
differsified according to the various natures of the objects.21
As mentioned, among the views arguing for a plurality of internal
sense powers, Suárez finds most probable the view of Averroes and
Aquinas that there are four such powers and it is this view that he
criticizes in most detail. Indeed, despite the weight of such impressive
authority, however, Suárez wants to argue that in fact there is only
one internal sense power, one that he calls, generally, phantasia. Now,
Vivarium, Vol. 39, No. 1 (2001): pg. 119-158. DOI. This article is © Brill Academic Publishers and permission has been
granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Brill Academic Publishers does not grant permission for
this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Brill Academic
Publishers.

8

NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page.

his basic argumentative strategy is to dispute the division of internal
senses that is based on the existence of different types of objects, that
is, the ordinary sensible qualities available to the five external senses
and the more peculiar intentions of danger, utility and the like
accessible to the estimative/cogitative power.22 Hewing closely to
Thomas’s exposition in the Summa theologiae, he views the latter’s
position as resting on two foundational principles. The point of both
principles is to demonstrate that the objects of internal sensory
experience are radically different. Here is how he sets forth the basic
point:
The fourth opinion [that of Averroes and Thomas], which is the
more probable among those mentioned, has a two-fold
foundation: The first is that sensitive cognition arises sometimes
through sensed species (species sensatae) and sometimes
through unsensed species (species insensatae) and powers
cognizing through them are distinct. For powers cognizing
through different types of species are themselves different. . . .
The second foundation is that in sensitive powers a power
cognizing in the presence of an object and a power cognizing in
the absence of an object are distinct powers. This is proven
since a power cognizing in the presence of an object ought to be
easily capable of apprehending and being immuted, while a
power cognizing in the absence of an object ought to be
conserving and retentive of species. Now these two properties
cannot exist in the same material power for easy apprehension
in corporeal bodies originates from moisture while retention
originates from dryness. These two cannot predominate in the
organ of the sense power, therefore. . . .23
In this passage we have two principles working in tandem to deliver
four distinct internal sense powers: a distinction between types of
sensory information and a distinction between intuitive and abstractive
powers. I shall call the former the “unsensed species principle” and the
latter the “presence/absence principle.” The former, perhaps, is the
most difficult point and the one that Suárez spends the most time
worrying over, while the distinction premised on the presence or
absence of the sensible object is rather straightforward.
A brief look at the corresponding texts of Aquinas will show that
Suárez rather accurately represents his thought in this regard. So, for
example, in Summa theologiae, I, q. 78, q. 4, Aquinas does indeed
state that a crucial attribute of a subset of the internal senses involves
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their ability to perform their proper operations in the absence of the
sensible object while the other internal sense powers require the
presence of the sensible object:
Now we must observe that for the life of a perfect animal the
animal should apprehend a thing not only at the actual time of
sensation, but also when it is absent.
From this principle he concludes that two of the internal sense powers,
the common sense and the estimative power, must be capable of
receiving easily the species from sensible objects while the other two,
the imagination and memory, must be able to retain species once
received. There is as well a physiological consequence that follows
from this distinction: the reception of species requires the internal
sense powers be appropriately “moist” in order that the apprehension
of species occurs in an optimal manner while retentive powers must be
“dry.” Thomas’s conclusion is straightforward: since the same power
cannot be both primarily moist and primarily dry, it follows that such
powers must be distinct. In sum, then, this basic physiological
difference between receptive and retentive powers corresponds to the
distinction between powers that require the presence of their objects
and those that do not. The result is a demarcation of the common
sense and estimation, as receptive, and imagination and memory, as
retentive.
What remains unclear is why four such internal senses are
required. Why not just have a sense power that is receptive and one
that is retentive? The answer, of course, is that there are two types of
sensory information received and consequently two types retained.
Thomas argues that there are two types of sensory information
available to the internal sense powers: that which is sensed by the
external senses and that which is not sensed by the external senses.
He writes:
But the animal needs to seek or to avoid certain things, not only
because they are pleasing or otherwise to the senses, but also
because of other advantages and uses, or disadvantages; just
as the sheep runs away when it sees a wolf, not because of its
color or shape, but as a natural enemy. . . . Animals, therefore,
need to perceive such intentions, which the exterior sense does
not perceive.24
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In Suárez’s terminology, this is the distinction between sensed species
(species sensatae) and unsensed species (species insensatae). He
explains this distinction by saying that sensed species are those that
represent sensible objects in the internal sense in the same way that
they are represented in the external senses. This is not to say that
such species are themselves actually sensed, it is just to say that the
sensible qualities sensed by the external senses are transmitted in
some way to the internal senses as well. The green on the tree that I
see is received in the common sense as an awareness of green.
Unsensed species, by contrast, are those that represent sensible
objects in some other manner, under some different aspect, than
objects are represented in the external senses. The standard example
is the way that a sheep perceives a wolf as dangerous. The main point
is that there is nothing in the sensed species of a wolf that would lead
a sheep to such a perception. So, there must be some additional
information available to the internal sense powers allowing them to
recognize that danger. Again, the conclusion follows rather
straightforwardly: if two sense powers sense different types of species,
they must be really distinct powers.
In summary, then, the two principles generate an account of
internal sensation that requires four distinct powers. We have two
receptive powers, the common sense and the imagination. The former
is receptive of the sensed species, the latter receptive of the unsensed
species. The two retentive powers, the estimation and memory, are
respectively retentive of sensed and unsensed species. The question
we must now consider is why Suárez rejects this derivation of internal
sense powers. As we have seen, Suárez does not dispute that there
are many operations that match up with terms such as common sense,
imagination, etc. However, he wants to argue that the only reason to
posit diverse powers for each operation would be if operations existed
that the same power could not perform. In other words, the number of
non-compossible operations determines how many distinct internal
sense powers we must posit. In addition, he believes that we should
not posit a distinct internal sense power based simply by restricting its
range of operations. What he means is that if there is one sense power
that receives unsensed species and another that both receives and
retains such species, we should only posit one sense power—the one
that has the greatest range of operations. The power with the more
restricted range would be redundant. In fact, he invokes an argument
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used by Thomas himself who stated that in the case of humans we
should not posit more interior sense powers than are present in the
perfect animals. If we should discover in humans some more perfect
sensory operation, it is not because of some additional power that it
has, but rather is due to the greater perfection of the sense power in
humans. In fact, Thomas explicitly uses this principle in rejecting the
Avicennian distinction between phantasia (the retention of sensed
species) and the imagination (the ability to creatively combine such
species) because in humans the imagination can perform both
operations.25
Suárez proceeds to reject the first of Thomas’s foundational
principles, namely, the presence/absence principle that requires
distinct powers due to the need for such powers to have different
physical natures (moist vs. dry). In this way, both the common
sense/phantasy duo and the cogitative/memory duo are reduced to
one power for each set. In one fell swoop, we go from four powers to
two. His argument for rejecting the principle involves recognizing that
a power knowing in the absence of an object must have previously
received a species of the absent object. So, for example, in order to
remember the tree in the park I sat under yesterday, I must have
sensed the tree in the park and formed a phantasm of it. If the original
experience generates a phantasm, there is no reason to think that the
phantasm I use the following day is any different from the original. If it
were, it would have arisen in the absence of the original object, yet
such a possibility is ruled out by the very passivity of sensory
experience. After all, a sensible object immutes a sense power only
when it is present to the power. Consequently, the common sense and
imagination, which are immuted only thanks to the external senses,
must both be immuted in the presence of the object. In this way both
are able to know in the presence of the object. Thus, Suárez concludes
that a power that can know in the absence of an object can know in
the presence of the object as well. His point here is rather subtle, but
amounts to the claim that reception and retention, apprehension and
conservation, are not differentiated by the presence and absence of
the object. The image I retain of the tree is the very image of the tree
that resulted from my original, present experience. In brief, if the
common sense is incapable of retaining sensed species, it cannot be
the source of my later imagination and the result is that the
imagination must have been immuted at the same time as the
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common sense, that is, when the object is present. Moreover, the case
of gold mountains, centaurs and the like, while more complicated, are
nonetheless reducible to experiences had in the presence of objects.
Suárez takes this argument as sufficient evidence that the
imagination is immuted in the presence of the object. Hence the
distinction between the reception and retention of species does not
prove that there must be separate powers to perform both functions.
Rather, it shows that both the apprehensive function of the common
sense and the retentive function of the imagination take place in the
same power. In this way the reception and retention of sensed species
by the same power shows that such operations are compossible and
his first principle—no positing of different powers for compossible
operations—is satisfied. The same line of reasoning shows that the
distinction between the estimative power and memory collapses as
well. The estimative power and memory are posited as having a
special type of object, the unsensed species. Putting aside for the
moment any questions of the existence of such species, it is clear that
there is no more reason to distinguish between the reception of the
unsensed species in the presence of the object and the conservation of
the same species. Again, the memory must receive such species to
retain at the same time as the estimative power apprehends them.26
The problem that remains for Suárez’s reductive strategy is the
argument concerning the physical composition of the internal sense
powers. Since dryness is supposed to be crucial for retention and
moistness for apprehension, Thomas argued that we must posit two
separate powers, one moist, one dry, for these two different
operations. Suárez responds by pointing to material substances that
both receive impressions and retain them, for example, lead
(plumbum). In addition, he points out that the reception and retention
of species is not a wholly material process, but rather is an intentional
process. While there is a material component to apprehension and
retention in the internal sense, the crucial aspect is the causing of
knowledge and that arises, he says, without any resistance.27 Finally
since the imagination can receive sensed species as well as retain
them, any attempt to posit a separate common sense that merely
receives sensed species runs afoul of Suárez’s second intuitively
plausible claim as well, namely, that there is no need to posit a power
with a lesser range of operation when there is a power that performs
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on a broader level. Thus, the mere presence or absence of a sensible
object is not sufficient to require a multiplicity of sense powers.
The second “foundation” provided by Thomas Aquinas for the
distinction between internal sense powers involved the “unsensed
species principle” and captured the idea that animals are aware of
more than is provided to them by the external senses. Suárez views
the distinction between types of species to be the primary motivation
for distinguishing between the common sense/phantasy duo and the
estimative/memory duo. He wants to argue that the distinction
between sensed and unsensed species is untenable, and in this way
remove any remaining foundation for a distinction of powers. The
focus of his attack is on the significance of the difference between the
sensed and unsensed species. Consider the sheep sensing the danger
of a wolf present to it and recognizing that it must fee. Suárez states
that experience suggests that there is a simultaneity in the sensing of
the wolf and the feeing. This sort of simultaneity only makes sense,
however, if it is one and the same species that presents the wolf to the
sheep and also presents the danger. Such sensory knowledge is
possible because animals have built in natural instincts such that when
they perceive something that is a danger, for instance, they fee.
Nonetheless, what they perceive is simply the sensible qualities of the
external object as presented to the common sense via the five
external senses. Suárez, then, is at a loss even to describe what an
unsensed species would be. How can a sensible species represent a
wolf under the aspect of “enemy”? The only way a sensible species can
represent anything is by representing the sensible qualities of the wolf:
its color, shape, scent, etc.28
Suárez concludes from these considerations that the internal
sense power is really and formally one power, and that the various
terms used of it show only a differsity imposed by reason both because
the acts of the power are different and because we think about the
power with inadequate concepts. He points out that his position on the
internal sense power is similar in inspiration to the more common view
that the intellect and will constitute one power although it performs a
multitude of differently described actions. Just as the intellect goes by
many names: intellect, reason, memory, speculative intellect, practical
intellect while remaining one power, so too the internal sense power is
describable in multiple ways, but those ways are compatible with its
being only one power.29
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With this rejection of the existence of unsensed species, we get
to the heart of Suárez’s account of internal sensation. Not only does he
remove a foundation for the view that the various functions of the
internal sense are operations of separate powers, he also shows
resistance to expanding the cognitive role of internal sensation. It
appears that he has two essential motivations. First, he wants to give
pride of place to the role of the external senses. They provide us with
immediate contact to the world around us and, along with the action of
the intellect, are sufficient to ground our understanding of the world.
Hence, the role of the internal senses is little more than a means of
“transferring” experience, as it were, from the excessively material
external senses to the immaterial intellect. The internal sense becomes
basically a mere intermediary, with little to do on its own other than
uniting the variety of external sensory experiences into a unified
whole. Second, he wants to stress the continuity between internal
sensation in animals and internal sensation in humans.
Positing an internal sense with the wide variety of functions that
Thomas’s cogitative power has in effect separates the sensitive powers
of humans too radically from that of animals. The consequence of this
second motivation, of course, is to recognize the possibility that a
much broader range of human activity is instinctual. So, when the
sheep only senses the wolf as its bundle of sensible accidents, it
instinctively fees. By the same reasoning, then, when a person senses
a particular threatening object, she does not sense anything special,
but rather instinctively responds to the sensory experience. Of course,
Suárez would, no doubt, point to the role that intellect and will could
play in teaching us to overcome such instinctual behavior, but the fact
would remain that much of our sensory life is instinctual.
As we saw above, one of the features of the cogitative power,
according to Thomas, was its function of incidental sensation, that is,
its ability to sense the individual under the collection of proper
sensibles attainable by the external senses. Suárez singles out this
function in particular and subjects it to a critique. He gives the
traditional definition of incidental sensation as that which in no way
immutes a sense power, but is only known through the immutation of
another object to which it is conjoined.30 With this understanding of
incidental sensation as a base, he can explain how a substance, an
individual of a kind, is sensed because while the substance itself does
not immute a sense power, the sensible accidents that are conjoined
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to the substance do. In other words, from the power (vis) of the
sensation of a thing that is per se sensible, something else is perceived
incidentally. That means the white that immutes the eye immutes it
insofar as it exists in a subject, and that subject is what we sense
incidentally. So far so good. However, Suárez also wants to insure that
we do not have some exaggerated opinion about the capabilities of the
internal sense power. After all, the incidental sensible, separate from
the proper sensibles, would be another type of unsensed species, and
we have already seen that Suárez has no use for such species. The
result is that there is no proper sensed species of the substance itself.
Instead, we properly sense only its accidents. Consequently, for
Suárez, incidental perception is of little moment. Basically the internal
sense power unites into a phantasm the likenesses of the proper
sensibles of a sensible object, proper sensibles that by their very
nature are themselves united within some substance. Nonetheless,
despite some verbal similarities with Thomas’s view, Suárez is
insistent that the sense does not know the individual as individual and
hence has no cognition of the individual as an instance of a kind. The
completed phantasm is no more than a collection of accidents. Recall
that when discussing the term “cogitative power,” Suárez was careful
to restrict its meaning to the functions of the estimative power as it
exists in humans. What this meant was that it was under the direction,
at least part of the time, of reason. It should come as no surprise,
then, to find that Suárez ascribes to reason and the intellect the ability
to know individuals as instances of a kind. The knowledge of the
substance of a singular object is the result of discursive and inferential
reasoning. It amounts to knowing the accidents of a subject and
noting how these accidents change over time. By noticing these
changes, the intellect comes to recognize that something stands under
these accidents and is able to arrive at the conception of a substance
as something that supports accidents.31 I shall return to a discussion of
the significance of placing such a restriction on the internal sense in
my concluding remarks. For now, though, I hope it is sufficient to note
how restricted is the scope of the internal sense power for Suárez. He
in effect blocks every attempt Thomas makes to enhance the power of
the internal sense, reserving those extended powers to the intellect.
The cogitative power is denied, accordingly, any transitional role in the
process of cognition. It does not itself reason or impart to the
phantasm any note of intelligibility not already present to the external
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senses. Such a result of his account of the internal sense power puts
into stark light the two problems we must next address. Given that the
internal sense provides no preparation of the phantasm, that is, it
adds nothing to the information received by the internal senses, it
seems that Suárez could be accused of positing a power that itself is
superfluous.32 Moreover, the problematic with which we started, how
the intellect can extract intelligibility from the data of sense, is even
more manifest. The gap between the phantasm and the intellect
appears just as great as that between the intellect and the external
senses. He owes us an account of the necessity of the internal sense
as performing some role that cannot be carried out by the external
senses alone, and he must explain the relation between intellect and
phantasm in such a way that the gap between the two can be crossed.

2. The Relation of the Internal Sense to the other
Cognitive Powers
In addition to the number and scope of the internal senses,
there is another traditional issue that Suárez takes up that is central to
his account of internal sensation. That issue is the relation of internal
sensation to external sensation and to intellectual cognition. Here
Suárez is best seen as reacting against two types of views. Both views
propose that the process of cognition is essentially a causal one. The
idea here is that at each of the steps of cognition, the preceding step
plays a direct causal role in the succeeding step. The first view holds to
a kind of transmission account in which, for example, the external
sense transmits its species to the internal sense whereupon the
internal sense produces the phantasm. On this view cognition is
essentially a passive operation in which something must be received at
each step along the way—the sensible species in the external senses,
the phantasm in the internal sense and the intelligible species in the
intellect. The second view is best seen as a subtle variant of the first
replacing the purely passive account of cognition with one that allows
for a more active role for each cognitive power in relation to its own
act. So, for example, on such a view, the sensible species in the
external sense plays some causal role in the production of the
phantasm in the internal sense. The causality involved here is usually
that of instrumental cause to principle cause: the sensible species is
the instrumental cause in the production of the phantasm. Despite the
priority of the principle cause, the causality of the preceding cognitive
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step is necessary, but not sufficient for the later step. The intellect
complicates the issue greatly since on either of these views, there
must be some way to explain how an essentially material entity, the
phantasm existing in the internal sense power, can effect a change in
an immaterial power such as the intellect. Even restricting the role of
the phantasm to instrumental cause and giving the principle cause to
the work of the agent intellect in its abstractive process requires that
we explain how the agent intellect can causally interact with the
material phantasm.
Again, Suárez uses Thomas Aquinas as the background against
which he will work out his own position. As we saw above, Thomas
straightforwardly asserts that the common sense, as the root and
principle of sensation, is the power in which all external sensation
terminates. Moreover, the common sense is able to discriminate
among the various sensible species it receives and is that power that is
reflexively aware of the activity of sensing. In addition, he
distinguishes the common sense from the imagination by stressing
that the common sense is physiologically suitable for the reception of
sensible species, while the imagination is physiologically suitable for
the retention of such species. By parallel reasoning, the reception of
the insensible intentions in the cogitative power are distinguished from
their retention in sense memory.33 I suggest, then, that this kind of
unproblematic reception in the internal senses of the species received
in external sensation is that against which Suárez wants to react.
Suárez offers two arguments in support of rejecting the notion
that an external sensible species can directly effect the internal sense.
The first argument involves the more perfect (perfectior) status of the
internal sense. Suárez takes it as axiomatic that the species must be
proportional to the power in which it inheres. Since the internal power
is more elevated than the external power, the external sensible
species is insufficient to perform the role of the total immediate
principle of the internal sensible species.34 Now in this objection he is
rejecting only the purely passive view of the transmission of the
sensible species to the internal sense such that by itself it cannot
account for the phantasm. Nonetheless, this argument from the “more
perfect” status of the internal sense leaves open the possibility that
the external sensible species plays some causal role in the transition
from external to internal sensation. The second argument is a bit more
complicated. Suárez accepts the standard view that the internal sense
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power is located in the brain. Now, given that the external sense
powers are located in the sense organs, some explanation must be
forthcoming to show how a species in an external sense power can be
transmitted to the internal sense power. Suárez believes that
supporters of the traditional account have two options. First, one could
claim that there are intervening media between the external powers
and the internal sense power such that the species can be transmitted
from the former to the latter. Suárez presses an empirical objection
against such an account to the effect that the media linking external
sense organs and powers to the internal sense power in the brain are
neither diaphanous nor illuminated. Of course, in external sensation
the medium has both of these characteristics and if either of these
conditions is missing, it is likely that sensation will be somehow
affected. As a result, Suárez points out that if the species were to
travel via the non-illuminated and opaque media between the external
and internal sense, it would suffer distortion in the process.35
Obviously, any such distortion would raise grave skeptical possibilities.
Suárez concedes that supporters of the passive transmission
view have another option open to them. They could argue that there
simply are no media between internal and external sense powers. In
other words, the external power acts directly on the internal power. As
he quickly points out, though, a theory along these lines must be able
to explain how such direct activity can occur given the spatial distance
between the powers. If the species of the external sense caused the
species in the internal sense at a distance, then whenever something
is sensed by the external sense, the internal sense would receive the
same species. Experience, however, is sufficient to demonstrate that a
perfectly functioning external sense can receive a species without
thereby sensing. He mentions such examples as the way in which
objects within our field of perception remain unnoticed by us, cases of
apoplexy, delirium and even mystical ecstasy. The problem for the
supporter of the transmission account is that if the mere reception of a
species in the external sense immediately causes the reception of the
same species in the internal sense, then it would be possible for the
delirious or ecstatic person to remember things that they could have
seen, but did not see.36 We must be careful here. Suárez is not
committing himself to the view that we only sense that of which we
are actually aware. In fact, he takes notice of the phenomena that we
sense aspects of our environment even when we are focused on other
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aspects.37 His point is rather that the only things that we can imagine
are those that we have actually sensed. Perhaps we can get at his
point with an example. Consider the person whose only experience of
a sweet food came at a time when she was running a fever. Suárez’s
point is that she cannot remember at some later time what that food
would have tasted like if she was not running a fever that blunted her
ability to taste it. In the same way, the ecstatic person who sees a
burning bush does not see the bush without fames at the same time.
These objections, focusing as they do on the fact that the
posited multiplication of the species would in fact result in distortion in
the internal sense, suggest a different account of the relation of
external sensation to internal sensation (and, by extension, the
relation of internal sense to intellect). Such an account would consist
in the claim that the crucial precondition of the activity of internal
sense must be the act itself of external sensation, or, as Suárez puts
the point: “The sensed species of the internal sense does not arise
from an external object by a mediate species, but from an external
sense by a mediate act of its cognition.”38 A little background on
Suárez’s account of external sensation will help us to understand this
position more clearly and he helpfully provides it for us:
. . . through an act of knowing there is produced its intrinsic
term, which is a representative quality of [a known] reality in
second act. Therefore, through this quality, which the external
sense forms within itself, one can believe with probability that
there is produced in the internal sense a species representative
of the same object . . .39
This passage is rather concise and needs to be unpacked a bit. The
basic idea is that the external sense power in its initial state is purely
potential in respect to the act of sensing. It must be actualized by the
reception of an external sensible species produced by a sensible
object. Once a species is received in the external sense, the power is
in a position to sense the external sensible object. However, Suárez
holds that the mere reception of the sensible species, while necessary,
is not sufficient for the act of sensing to take place because the power
that has received the sensible species has been actualized, but only up
to a point. It is no longer purely passive, but it also is not yet actually
sensing. This first level of actuality must be raised to the act of
sensing itself. This actualization is the work of the sense power itself.
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This second level of actuality is simply the act of sensing and results in
a qualitative change in the sense power. The major point for Suárez is
that the qualitative change is chiefly the work of the sense power itself
in cooperation with the determination brought to it by the external
sensible species. While he is willing to call the act of sensation, as
qualitative change, an “expressed species,” he does not think that this
species is some product distinct from the act of sensation itself. The
two levels of actuality within sensation explain why he is unwilling to
accept that the sensible species is simply transmitted to the inner
sense. If the sensible species is not able to cause by itself the act of
external sensation, it cannot be expected to cause the act of internal
sensation. Moreover, since the expressed species is only the
completed act of sensation, there is no left over “product” in the act of
external sensation to be transmitted to the internal sense.40
This brief summary of the external sensory process enables us
to understand the basic framework for internal sensation. Just as
external sensation requires two successive “actualizations,” so too
does internal sensation. Hence, when Suárez states that the species of
internal sensation arises from external sensation, he is arguing that
the first level of actuality of internal sensation is dependent on
external sensation, not the sensible species of external sensation.
Again, caution is in order. We must not conclude that the act of
external sensation is somehow transmitted to the internal sense
power. Suárez has already dealt with the problems raised by any
transmission account: a result of external sensation would still have to
“jump the gap” between the less perfect power and the more perfect
internal sense power. Moreover, there is an important difference
between internal and external sense powers that must be factored into
a transmission account. External sensation relies on the presence of a
sensible object for both its origin and conservation. Such is not the
case with internal sensation. Also, since a species should be
proportional to its power, the fact that internal and external senses are
different powers requires that their species be different. Suárez’s
conclusion is clear and succinct: the expressed species of external
sensation, that is, the actual activity of sensation, and the impressed
species of internal sensation are really distinct.41 As a result, he must
provide us with an account of the relation between external sensation
and internal sensation that both allows for the activity of external
sensation, but avoids the traditional view that there is some sort of
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transmission of a species between the external and internal sense
powers.
While it might be thought that he has driven too deep a wedge
between the two sense powers, this is not so. While the inner sense is
the more perfect power, the act of external sensation is the more
perfect act. So it is at least possible for the higher grade of actuality to
be productive of a lower level of actuality. That is all Suárez needs. He
is looking for something that can bring the internal sense power to the
first level of actuality. He finds it in the second level of actuality
achieved by the external sense.
Now you say: if these species [external and internal] differ in
kind, the internal species will be a more perfect species than
external sensation because it is an act of a more noble power.
Therefore, it cannot be produced (producere) by the former. I
respond by denying the first consequence, for the comparison is
not correct. Therefore, in comparing the first act of one power
to the first act of another, that one is more perfect which is an
act of a more perfect power, and it is the same in comparing the
second acts to each other. Nevertheless, in comparing a second
act of a less perfect power to the first act of a more perfect
power, the former will be more perfect because in its own
nature it is constituted in a higher grade of actuality.42
However, while he has shown that it is possible for the lower power to
produce a species in the higher power, he has not yet explained the
productive process.
In fact, it turns out that to speak of a productive process
between the external and internal sense powers is quite misleading.
We cannot understand the external sense as productive in the manner
in which an efficient cause is productive. His claim, which sounds
rather strange on the surface, is that the internal sensible species is
really the result of the activity of the internal sense power itself. This is
due to the fact that no act of cognition ever produces any quality
distinct from itself.43 This is a crucial element of his theory. The point
he is making involves the relation between the act of cognition as act
and the product of the act, the expressed species or concept. By
denying any real distinction between act and resulting product, he
aims to safeguard the directness of cognitional activity at the same
time that he takes away any kind of species that, separated from its
originary act, could be passed along to another power. The result of
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the cognitive activity simply is the cognitive activity and there is no
other result of cognitive activity, no distinct species, that can be
multiplied to another power.
If the transmission account of species does not explain how one
power enters into the operation of another power (or, in the
terminology he used above, how the external sense can be productive
of the activity of the internal sense), we still need an account of how
the imagination can produce its own species. Here, Suárez has
recourse to an interesting theory about the relation between the
various powers of the soul. While the powers, for example the various
external senses, the internal sense and the intellect, are all really
distinct from one another, nonetheless, they all flow from the same
soul and consequently, to use his term, are “rooted” in the same soul.
He states:
The interior and exterior senses are rooted (radicare) in the
same soul, and thus it is the same soul that sees through vision
and imagines through imagination. There is, therefore, a natural
harmony (consensio) among these powers since from the very
fact that the soul perceives some reality it immediately forms a
likeness (similitudo) of that reality in its imagination through the
power of the imagination itself, not by means of a power distinct
from the imagination. So, for example, given an external
sensation, a species naturally results in the interior sense from
the activity of the soul itself through the imagination, not from
the activity of sensation, although in the presence of the reality
sensed.44
This important passage is not immediately transparent. The basic
negative point is clear, though: the actions of the external senses are
not the cause of the production of a species within the internal sense
power itself. For that we need to posit the soul itself, present equally
to both powers, which is somehow able to provide the internal sense
with the result of the activity of the external senses.
Unfortunately, Suárez is sketchy on the details of this process,
simply letting the notion of the soul’s presence to the internal sense
suffice as an explanatory device. Nonetheless, the basic idea is
sufficiently clear: while vision, for example, performs the operation of
visual perception, the soul, as its source, perceives. In other words,
the soul “perceives” through vision. Now, Suárez cannot mean
“perceives” here in a purely literal manner. After all, the sense power
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of vision perceives and one of Suárez’s arguments concerning the
nature of external sensible species points out that they cannot immute
the soul directly insofar as they are material realities, but instead must
immute the sense power.45 Hence, he must mean something more like
an awareness that the soul has of its powers’ operations. Something
more is at work in this view as well, I believe. He is pointing to the fact
that the soul’s cognitive powers are also dependent on the soul itself
for their existence insofar as they flow from the soul at the first
moment of the soul’s creation. In other words, while the powers retain
their distinctness from the soul, it remains the case that the soul is
their source and origin. Consequently, there must exist some relation
between the soul and its powers such that the soul is both aware of
the powers’ activities and in some way is productive of those activities
as well.
We shall soon see how he cashes out the “awareness” about
which I am now speaking. Now, though, I want to bring out one
further issue stemming from his claims about the relation between
cognitive powers. There is, after all, a fundamental difference between
internal and external sense. The external senses are dependent on
objects in the external world for their operations. The internal sense,
though, being a step further along in the cognitional process is
dependent proximately on the external sense powers, not the external
world. At the same time, however, it can also act independently of the
external senses in such cases as dreaming, remembering past sensory
images, and other like operations. Hence, the role that soul plays in
internal sensory cognition is going to be quite different than the one it
plays in external sensation. Recall that in external sensation, the sense
power is brought to its first level of actuality when it receives the
sensible species. At that point, the sense power itself takes over and
raises itself to the second level of actuality. Now, the internal sense
power does not, as we have seen, receive a species from the external
senses, nor does it receive one from the soul. There is simply no
transmission of any species at all. This crucial difference in the internal
and external senses points us to a basic understanding of the role of
the soul in internal sensation. It must in some way contribute to the
level of first actuality in the internal sense. Tying things together a bit,
the soul’s awareness must contribute to the elevation of the internal
sense to the first level of actuality, that is, to its production of a
phantasm.
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At this point Suárez owes us an account of the mechanism by
which the soul acts. He has already begun by asserting an essentially
negative point, namely, there is no efficient cause of the act of the
internal sense other than the power itself. Therefore, we should not
view the soul’s awareness of the act of seeing, for example, as the
efficient cause of the imagination’s act of imagining. If the soul is not
an efficient cause, what kind of role does it play in the imagination’s
operation? To answer this question, we must have recourse to his
account of the activity of the intellect. Like the imagination, the
intellect is a power really distinct from the soul as well as the other
powers of the soul. So far, he has argued that the sensory apparatus
consists of two clusters of cognitional activity, each essentially selfcontained, but relatively connected: external sensation, and internal
sensation. Now, external sensation is dependent on its own activity in
concurrence with the actual sensible object’s species while internal
sensation is dependent on the activity of external sensation, but that
activity has no direct effect on the internal sense. Instead, the internal
sense is somehow aware of the result of the external sense through
the intermediary awareness of the soul itself. The intellect is a third
such component of cognitive activity and, as we might expect, is not
directly dependent on the activity of the internal sense. Indeed, the
internal sense has no direct effect on the intellect, although the
intellect is dependent on the activity of the internal sense in much the
same way that the internal sense is dependent on the external senses.
The reason for this complicated picture of the activity of the intellect is
clear enough, given that the phantasm itself is material and the
intellect is immaterial,46 but that cannot be the only reason. Rather,
the intellect is just a special case of the primary independence and
relative dependence of the soul’s powers. There will be, then, a
striking parallel in the relation between internal and external sensation
and the relation between internal sensation and intellect. If we can
understand the latter, we should be in a position to understand the
former as well.
Suárez goes to great lengths to argue that not only does the
internal sense have no direct role in the work of the agent intellect,
but also that the agent intellect does not do anything to the phantasm
in order to produce the intelligible species, thereby repudiating any
theory of the agent intellect in which it is asserted that “there is a
certain spiritual power in us . . . whose work is to illuminate (illustrare)
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phantasms and in this way to make (efficere) the intelligible
species.”47 The basic implication of such a view is that the agent
intellect and the phantasm must concur in the production (producere)
of the intelligible species since if the agent intellect were able to
produce the intelligible species without any dependence on the
phantasm it would simultaneously be able to produce the species of all
realities and would have no dependence on sensation at all.48 So, while
he wants to preserve such a concurrence, he must be careful to
explain what the concurrent activity is and he does this by first
discussing what the activity is not He accepts the following as essential
data that must be saved in any explanation of the relation of
phantasm and agent intellect:
(a) The agent intellect never creates (efficere) a species unless
it is determined by the cognition of internal sense.49
(b) Such a determination cannot arise from the efficacy of the
phantasm, that is, the phantasm is not the efficient cause of the
agent intellect’s act.50
Now, (a) is relatively unproblematic given the essential union between
body and soul, and is a mainstay in Aristotelian inspired accounts of
intellectual cognition. He states:
The soul, while it is in the body, has an intrinsic dependence on
the phantasy, that is, it cannot operate through the intellect
unless it operates actually through a phantasm at the same
time. . . . Not because the phantasms themselves are
understood, that is, are cognized, but because through them the
phantasy operates with the intellect simultaneously.51
It is (b) that is the crux of Suárez’s position and in support he appeals
to the exact same principle that he used to explain the relation
between external and internal senses. The internal sense and the
agent intellect are rooted in the same soul and hence they have an
order (ordo) and harmony (consonantio) in their operations.52 As a
result, there is no direct causal connection in either direction, that is,
the phantasm has no direct causal role in the work of the agent
intellect and the agent intellect has no direct causal action in regard to
the phantasm. Instead, there is some sort of “determination” involved
in the relation between agent intellect and phantasm:
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The agent intellect never effects a species unless it is
determined by the cognition of the phantasy. . . . Now the
reason can be: for the agent intellect is indifferent to effecting
all species and consequently, so that it might effect “these” or
“those”, it requires some determinant. But there is nothing else
by which it can be determined except the phantasy’s cognition.53
Notice that here in discussing the relation between phantasm and
agent intellect we have an emphasis on the second level of actuality
(the phantasy’s cognition) as determinative in exactly the same way in
which the external sensory operations are related to the internal
sense. Yet in that case we saw that the determination was in fact
rather indirect. There was no transmission of species from the external
sense to the internal sense, but rather the soul’s “awareness” played
the key role. The same is true for the phantasy/agent intellect
relation: the phantasm, by virtue of its existence in the internal sense,
acts as a kind of “matter” in relation to the agent intellect, “either
through exciting the soul or at least as an exemplar.”54 Now, the
relation between the phantasm and the agent intellect is not an
arbitrary or accidental one:
It is said that in the soul’s powers there is another mode of
determination insofar as one power prepares the matter of
another, or insofar as one power’s act has a necessary
connection with the other’s act.55
The picture that is emerging from these rather enigmatic statements is
one in which there is no causal connection between powers, although
there is a necessary one. Hence when Suárez talks of “matter” in this
context, we cannot take him to mean “material cause,” but instead
must understand matter here in some loose sense at a determining
influence. In addition, we have an added piece of the puzzle in his
mention of an “exciting of the soul” that takes place when one power
operates.
Returning to the activity of the internal sense in relation to the
external senses in light of the discussion of the relation between
phantasm and agent intellect, the phantasm is produced by the
imagination directly using the data of the external senses as a kind of
matter. The kind of necessary connection referred to in the discussion
of the agent intellect applies here as well, yet the talk of “necessary
connection” is somewhat problematic. Clearly, the assertion of the
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necessary connection between sense and imagination and imagination
and intellect is designed to accomplish a couple of philosophic tasks.
First, and foremost, it is designed to alleviate the discomfort that
might be caused in his rejecting a view according to which one act of
cognition directly causes the next until we reach the final step of
intellectual cognition. In other words, in denying a continuous and
direct line of causation from sensible object to intellectual knowledge,
it might be thought that he is introducing a note of skepticism into his
account of cognition. However, by pointing to the necessary
connection of the independent operations and powers of external
sensation, internal sensation and intellect, he seems to avoid such a
consequence. Of course, the mere assertion of a necessary connection
is not sufficient, but we are not yet in a position to judge his success in
avoiding skeptical consequences. I shall return to a consideration of
the issue of skepticism in the conclusion of the paper. The second
philosophical task accomplished is to mark the fact that the power
itself, while responsible for producing its act, still maintains some
dependence on acts that have preceded. Indeed, the phantasm is
restricted to the contents of sensory experience, and even its creative
aspects is limited by its prior sensory cognitions.
There is one remaining problem that must be addressed before
we can understand his account fully. Suárez’s theory of cognition, and
more particularly of the production of the phantasm and intelligible
species, is dependent on there being a structural sort of analogy
between imagination and intellect. In fact he tells us that the
intelligible species arises “in the same way” as the phantasm.56 Now,
the problem arises when we consider that the agent intellect is
productive of the intelligible species, but there is no power in the
internal sense analogous to the agent intellect, at least in the
traditional delineation of sense powers. This would seem to threaten
the structural analogy between the two powers. In fact, though, he
argues that in the internal sense power there is an ability that
deserves to be called an agent internal sense and that it produces
phantasms. Of course, he recognizes that there is no warrant in either
the text of Aristotle or in the authority of Thomas for calling the
internal sense an “agent” power:
But to the negative authority of Aristotle, that he never spoke of
this, I respond that he also of never spoke of nor treated
precisely many other matters. It is true that St. Thomas
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(Summa Theologiae I, q. 79, a. 3, ad 1) seems to deny this
activity of species to every sense, but perhaps he is speaking of
senses in regard to the first reception of species that arises from
the object, from which there then arises the production of some
other species.57
The rather defensive tone of this passage is noticeable and
suggests that he knows he is striking out on his own and that allusions
to the tradition are not going to be relevant for the explication of his
theory. Now, the positing of an agent sense power immediately raises
a problem. Suárez, as we have seen, argued extensively for the unity
of the internal sense power, yet the existence of an agent sense power
appears to threaten that unity. Is he after all committed to there being
two powers: an agent internal sense and a potential internal sense?
The answer is no, but to see that, we need to take another brief detour
through his account of the intellect.
Suárez is aware of a range of views concerning the agent and
potential intellects. He recognizes that both Aristotle and Thomas, for
example, speak of the two intellects as distinct realities (res distinctae)
and that Averroes, following a Greek tradition, argues that they are
separate substances distinct from the human soul.58 Nonetheless, he
views as most probable (valde probabilis) the teaching of Augustino
Nifo, in his De intellectu that in fact the agent and potential intellects
are one and the same power.59 The arguments in support of this
teaching not only provide us with the means of understanding how the
agent intellect functions, but also, by extension, how the internal
agent sense is and is not related to sensory experience. While Suárez
presents several arguments in support of this thesis, he places
greatest emphasis on the way in which his account provides a role for
the agent intellect, both in this life and in the one to come. The basic
idea is that the human intellect is midway between that of angels and
that of animals with purely sensitive souls. Angelic intellects have no
need of abstracting species from phantasms, so species exist innately
(inditae) in them, while the sensitive soul, having no such innate
species requires the agency of external objects to initiate the sensory
process. The crucial passage reads:
The angelic intellect has from its nature innate species of all
realities that, as it were, flow from the proper power of the
intellect as (quasi) passions flow from an essence. However, the
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sensitive power, especially (maxime) the external senses, lack
species and receive them from outside objects. Now our intellect
also by its nature lacks species—in which it also falls short of the
perfection of an angelic intellect—nevertheless it has a certain
agreement with it, namely, that as soon as our soul knows some
reality through the phantasy a species representing that reality
flows (dimanare) from the intellect itself. So, this agency is
more in the manner of a certain emanation of the species from
the intellect, and thus that agency is not a distinct power.60
Here we have a pretty radical rethinking of the nature of the agent
intellect. The agent intellect becomes, in effect, the name given to an
internal agency within the intellect, an emanation, by which the
species arises in the intellect when the internal sense power performs
its proper operation. This passage provides us with the only discussion
of an alternative mechanism to the literal reception of a species. The
intellect simply does not receive a species from outside itself. And, just
as the intellect does not receive the phantasm from the internal sense
so too it follows that the internal sense does not receive the sensible
species from the external senses.
One reason, he believes, for rethinking the notion of the agent
intellect is that the naturalness, as it were, of the agent intellect is
protected, since if it were distinct from the potential intellect, after the
current life, it would have nothing to do. However, the idleness of a
distinct agent intellect in the afterlife would mean that the intellect in
this life is arranged in an ad hoc manner. The idea here is that the
agent intellect only has a job to do, on a more traditional
interpretation, when it abstracts and illuminates the phantasm. Hence,
the soul separated from the body and deprived of phantasms would
have no need for an agent intellect. By claiming that the agent
intellect is simply an efficiency within the intellect itself by which the
species through which we know arise, he is preserving a role for it
independent of any particular state in which the intellect as a whole
finds itself.61
In addition, the comparison of the way that species flow from
the intellect with the manner in which a passio flows from an essence
is of some importance. Suárez differentiates between a passio and
common accident by noting that a passio cannot be separated from an
essence, while a common accident can be so separated and the reason
for this inseparability is based on the fact that the passio is “rooted”
(radicare) in the essence in a way that a common accident is not.62
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While we should be careful not to push too far the analogy between
species and intellect on the one hand and essence and passio on the
other, nonetheless the analogy does signify the extremely close
connection, perhaps even inseparability, of the species and the
intellect from which it flows.
One important consequence of this line of thought is that the
denial of a causal connection between the phantasm and the agent
intellect, other that the concomitance of the internal sense and the
intellect, shows a commitment to a form of “occasionalism” insofar as
the work of the internal sense is an occasion for, but not a cause of,
the activity of the intellect. However, he does provide us with some
context for understanding how the one power occasions the other by
telling us that it is as matter or exemplar that the external sense
relates to the internal sense. Such an occasionalism even in the case
of internal sensation may strike us as odd, but it follows from his
fundamental premise of the non-causal relation existing among all
cognitive powers and he is driven to assert that non-causal connection
because he can find no causal account that works. Moreover, this
occasionalism along with the fact that the species flows from the
intellect itself immediately raises the possibility that Suárez is
committed to some form of innatism. In other words, the species are
already present in the intellect and simply need some determinate, but
non-causal experience, say the soul’s awareness of the activity of the
internal sense, to be produced.
It is necessary to be careful in the ascription of innatism to his
account and we must be clear on the defnition of innatism in this
case.63 On at least one understanding, the term “innate” extends not
just to actual preexistent knowledge, but also to latent and
dispositional knowledge. Latent knowledge is that which is present in
the soul but not such as to have been known prior to the experience
that causes the knowledge to surface, while dispositional knowledge is
a kind of structural principle or principles that accounts for and
predetermines the type of knowledge we can have.64 Now, it is clear
that Suárez is not committed to any form of explicit pre-existent
knowledge. After all, he wants to save a place for the concurrence of
imagination and intellect and the link between them seems rather
stronger than talk about a kind of platonic recollection. Indeed, he
explicitly rejects Plato’s account of knowledge saying that it ignores
the natural union of soul and body. Moreover, he endorses the claim,
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attributed to Aristotle, that the intellect is a tabula rasa.65 Nonetheless,
the fact remains that the knowledge of the senses, both external and
internal, is not causally connected to the activity of the intellect. The
intellect produces the intelligible species from within itself with the
mere “determination” or “example” of the senses to work with.
Consequently, he is juggling two concerns and they mix rather
uneasily. The conclusion that there must be some form of innatism in
the case of intellect is inescapable. Consider the following passage
from Descartes by way of comparison:
. . . if we bear well in mind the scope of our senses and what it
is exactly that reaches our faculty of thinking by way of them,
we must admit that in no case are the ideas of things presented
to us by the senses just as we form them in our thinking. So
much so that there is nothing in our ideas which is not innate to
the mind or the faculty of thinking, with the sole exception of
those circumstances which relate to experience, such as the fact
that we judge that this or that idea which we now have
immediately before our mind refers to a certain thing situated
outside us. We make such a judgement not because these
things transmit the ideas to our mind through the sense organs,
but because they transmit something which, at exactly that
moment, gives the mind occasion to form these ideas by means
of the faculty innate to it.66
The similarities (and differences) are striking between the teaching of
this passage and Suárez’s account. While Suárez betrays no concern
about the potential disagreement between the intelligible species and
the phantasm that determines it, he nonetheless is as emphatic as
Descartes is about the way in which these species flow from the
intellect itself with internal sensory experience providing only the
occasion for the production of the species. Indeed, in a discussion of
the way in which accidents flow from an essence, Suárez gives an
important explanation of the process:
Form is not active unless there is a naturally resultant activity
from it, which is called a “flowing” (dimanatio), for an effective f
owing without an action is difficult to understand. Similarly, it is
said that the same reality does not act in itself except in this
genus of accident, that is, a result, or certainly that it does not
act unless as a power of generating.67
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The implication from this passage is that the production of the species
is a “naturally resultant activity” from the power itself. It is hard to see
how the species, then, could be considered anything but innate, not in
the sense of the platonic theory as he understands it, but as some sort
of dispositional or latent theory.
Now, there is one crucial way in which the analogy between
Descartes’s and Suárez’s accounts breaks down. Descartes is talking
about full-blown innate ideas, that is, bits of knowledge. Suárez,
however, is discussing only the generation of the intelligible species
and does not identify these species with actual knowledge. Since the
intelligible species is only a “partially completing immediate
instrument” (partialiter complens immediatum instrumentum),68 he is
not committed to the claim that our concepts are innate in any way
other than Thomas would be. They are innate because they are
produced by the intellect itself. Where he diverges from Thomas would
be the denial of causality between the internal sense and the intellect.
This account of the agent intellect is all we have from which we
can extrapolate how the internal sense is properly named an “agent”
internal sense. We have noted above that the external senses have no
direct causal role in the formation of an act of internal sensation other
than as a kind of “matter” or determination of the internal sense. It
follows, as odd as it may sound, that the species within the internal
sense by which it imagines, remembers, cogitates and performs its’
other functions must in fact be its own product, a product occasioned
by, but not caused by, the activity of the external senses. Now, Suárez
does state that the senses lack species and thus need the agency of
something external. However, he qualifies that claim by pointing out
that such a requirement applies especially (maxime) to the external
senses.69 In fact by immediately adding this qualification, he is
pointing to the much more complicated picture of internal sensation
with which he furnishes us, one in which the internal sense lacks a
species in only a qualified manner, namely because it needs some
determination from the external senses in order to produce its own
species within itself. So, unlike external sensory experience, which
requires that the power receive a species from the sensible object, the
internal sense produces its own species. Most importantly, it follows
from the structural parallels obtaining between internal sense and
intellect that the products of the internal sense are innate. Such a
conclusion cannot help but sound odd to us, but I can see no other
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way to account for the strict similarities that Suárez mentions in
discussing the two powers. It follows, then, that internal sensible
species, phantasms, flow from the very agency of the internal sense
power in accordance with a determination from the soul. The soul itself
is affected by (is excited by), but not effected by external sensation.
Hence, it really does seem that if we have a noneffective “exciting,”
that the soul itself must be actively aware of what is happening in its
powers. Only such an active awareness accounts for both the nonpassivity of the soul and its determinative role in both internal
sensation and intellect.
There is, then, a striking parallel between the need for an agent
internal sense and an agent intellect. Both are required because the
intellect and the internal sense cannot know without some
determination from outside themselves, yet at the same time, nothing
outside the relevant power is causally present in the two powers.
Consequently, Suárez posits an efficiency, a “resultantia,” within each
of the two powers. He can then argue that the power itself produces
the species by which it knows so that all causality resides in the power
itself. At the same time, though, while the species arises from the
power itself, there must be some determination that prompts, as it
were, the power to create one species and not another. In the
movement from external sensation through internal sensation to
intellectual cognition, each power produces an act of cognition and a
proper species through which it knows. However, the effect of that
cognitive act is severely circumscribed. One power’s act of cognition is
not the cause of the next power’s act. Instead, each act of cognition
merely has some effect on the soul in which the power is rooted such
that the soul determines the succeeding power’s cognitive act. In the
case of both internal sensation and intellectual cognition, he uses the
term “agent” to point to a certain activity present within the power
itself that allows it to know, and he is willing to call that activity by a
name that usually denotes a distinct power. One cannot help but sense
that Suárez is straining to be creative within a traditional scholastic
vocabulary, and that the traditional vocabulary both provides an
access to his thought and obscures, at first anyway, the novel ways in
which he is using it.70
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Conclusion
In this paper, I have tried to provide an overview of the main
themes of Suárez’s account of internal sensation by stressing two main
issues. The first involves his reduction of a multiplicity of such internal
powers to just one power. The second involves the complex
relationship that obtains between the internal sense power and the
other cognitive powers (the external senses and the intellect). I now
want to conclude by a making a few general remarks about his
account. The most striking feature of his theory is the way in which he
downplays any progressive cognitive role for the internal sense. The
strong impression we get is that the internal sense just replicates and
synthesizes the information received from the external senses. Of
course, one of its operations is a kind of creative imagination whereby
I can construct fictional objects such as gold mountains. However, he
resists importing into the internal sense any real ability to reason
about its objects. The internal sense becomes little more than an
instinctive capacity. There is no reasoning internal to it so its work is
pretty much automatic. Now, he recognizes that reason can direct the
activity in some way, but that feature refers more to the way in which
the intellect might direct the attention of the internal sense.
Lost in Suárez’s account is any of the richness present in
Thomas’s. The internal sense in humans is little different than the
internal sense in animals. It is worth considering why Suárez might
abandon this richer account of internal sensation. The justification can
be found in their differing conceptions of the role of intellect. It is a
well-known fact that for Thomas the proper object of the intellect is
the common nature or essence present in material singular objects.71
Consequently, the gap between the particularity of sense and the
universality of intellection is quite large. By developing a rich account
of internal sensation, Thomas mediates this gap by importing quasireasoning features into internal sense. Suárez has no such worry. He
holds that the proper object of the intellect is the material singular
object itself.72 It is the work of the intellect, after its initial knowledge
of the singular, to discern the universal features of nature.
Accordingly, the only mediating function appropriate to the internal
sense is providing a synthesized phantasm representing the sensible
accidents of a singular object in a unifed manner. I need a phantasm
of that tree before I can have that tree present to my intellect. Thus,
the intelligible species is not a representation of the universal nature
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present in material objects, but is only an immaterial representation of
a material phantasm. The agent intellect’s operation involves no
universalizing. Given these different starting points, it seems
unproblematic that Suárez rejects all the mediating work that
Thomas’s account of internal sensation supplies. This rejection of the
rich mediation of internal sense also leads to a strikingly different
account of the relation of the internal senses to the other cognitive
powers. By making each of the cognitive powers self-contained, he
isolates the intellect from the sense powers. His convoluted theory of
the non-causal mechanisms of cognition suggest a dissatisfaction with
accounts of human cognition that do not take into consideration the
radical dualism implicit in the distinction between the materiality of
sense and the immateriality of intellect. Most impressive is the way in
which he sets up the parallel between the pairs external
sensation/internal sensation and internal sensation/intellect. This
structural parallel shows that the issue is not just one of immaterial
power/material power, but rather concerns the distinctness of powers.
The result is that the soul itself must play a role in cognition.
Specifying that role, as we saw, is quite difficult, but it at the very
least we can think of it as a kind of general awareness of the contents
of the distinct powers. However, while it is unclear if that awareness is
conscious or preconscious in some way, it remains the case that the
separate activities of the powers are insufficient in and of themselves
to account for our cognition. The commitment to the distinction of
powers seems to rest on two foundations: the radical discontinuity
between material powers and immaterial powers as well as the
inability to discover some mechanism by which the external senses
could communicate their information to the internal senses. The
impression one gets is that Suárez was driven to his account because
no other account was unproblematic. While his own account may seem
excessively baroque, he never accepts needless complexity. This
radical distinctness of powers also leads, in the end, to his acceptance
of the innate presence, whether latent or merely dispositional, of
species in both the internal sense and the intellect, requiring only
some logically prior occasion to bring forth the species.
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Notes
* An early draft of the first part of this paper was read at the International
Congress on Medieval Studies, Kalamazoo, MI in May 1998. I want to
thank the Marquette University Philosophy Department for providing
me with a reduced course load in Spring 1999 that gave me the time
to rewrite and expand the initial paper. I am grateful to Edward P.
Mahoney, Anthony Lisska and Richard C. Taylor for many helpful
conversations.
1. The standard biography of Suárez is Raoul Scorraile, François Suárez de la
Compagnie de Jesus, 2 vols, Paris 1911. More recent discussions
include Jorge J. E. Gracia, Francisco Suárez: The Man in History, in:
The American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly, 55 (1991), 259-66;
Carlos, Noreña, Suárez and the Jesuits, in: American Catholic
Philosophical Quarterly, 55 (1991), 267-86; For overviews of Suárez’s
influence, see J. Irriarte, La proyección sobre Europa de un gran
metafísica, o Suárez en la flosofía en los días del Barroco, in: Razón y
Fe, número extraordinario, (1948), 229-65; Jean-François Courtine,
Suárez et le systèm de la métaphysique, Paris 1991, 405-18; John P.
Doyle, Suárez—The Man, His Work and His Infuence, in: Francisco
Suárez, Disputation LIV, trans. John P. Doyle, Milwaukee 1995, 1-15.
For a catalog of the works of Suárez, see M. Solana, Historia de la
flosofía española, epoca del Renacimiento, vol. III, Madrid 1941, 33340.
2. Francisco Suárez, Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in libros Aristotelis
De anima, ed. Salvador Castellote, 3 vols., Madrid 1978-1991.
Henceforth, I will cite this work as DA, followed by disputation,
question and paragraph. This work has a rather complicated textual
history. Brief y, the Commentaria is the result of Suárez’s early
teaching assignment at Segovia in 1572. The work was never
published in Suárez’s lifetime. However, towards the end of his life,
Suárez decided to rework the material for publication. He replaced the
nomenclature of “disputation” and “question” with that of “book” and
“chapter” and managed to rework the entire first disputation and the
first six questions of the second disputation before his death in 1617.
When his editor, P. Alvarez put together the final edition of the work in
1621, he used the revised first books (based on the first 18 questions
of the early version) and the early manuscript to make a complete
work. Castellote’s recent critical edition of the entire early version is
the one I follow here. For the full manuscript history of the
Commentaria, see Castellote’s introduction to vol. 1, xxxvii-lxviii.
3. Summa theologiae I, q. 57, a. 1 ad 2: “Dicendum quod sensus non
apprehendit essentias rerum, sed exteriora accidentia tantum.
Similiter neque imaginatio, sed apprehendit solas similitudines
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4.

5.

6.

7.
8.
9.

corporum. Intellectus autem solus apprehendit essentias rerum.” All
translations from the Summa theologiae are from Basic Writings of
Saint Thomas Aquinas, New York 1945, edited and annotated, with an
introduction, by Anton C. Pegis. Latin texts are from Summa
theologiae, cura et studio Instituti Studiorum Medievalium Ottaviensis,
ad textum S. Pii Pp. V iussu confectum recognita, Ottawa 1941-45.
DA IX.4.1 (vol. III: 152): “Est differentia magna inter sensum et intellectus
quod sensus in externorum accidentium sensibilium cognitione sistit,
intellectus vero non sic, sed ex accidentium cognitione ad
contemplanda ea quae sub accidentibus latent ingreditur, et ideo
intellectus dictus est quasi «intus legens».”
Recent accounts of Aristotle’s theory of the imagination include: Martha C.
Nussbaum, Aristotle’s “De motu animalium”: Text with Translation,
Commentary, and Interpretive Essays, Princeton 1978, 221-69;
Malcolm Scofield, Aristotle on the Imagination, in: G. E. R. Lloyd and
G. E. L. Owen (eds.), Aristotle on Mind and the Senses: Proceedings of
the Seventh Symposium Aristotelicum, Cambridge 1978, 99-140,
reprinted in:, Martha C. Nussbaum and Amelie O. Rorty (eds.), Essays
on Aristotle’s “De anima”, Oxford 1992,249-77. Dorthea Frede (The
Cognitive Role of phantasia in Aristotle, in: Essays on Aristotle’s “De
anima”, 279-96) stresses the mediating role that imagination plays
between sense cognition and intellectual cognition.
For developments in the theory of the internal senses after Aristotle, see
Harry A. Wolfson, The Internal Senses in Latin, Arabic and Hebrew
Philosophic Texts, in: Harvard Theological Review 2,8 (1935), 69-133,
reprinted in: Isadore Twersky and George H. Williams (eds.), Studies
in the History of Philosophy and Religion, vol. 1, Cambridge, Mass.
1973, 250-314; George Klubertanz, The Discursive Power: Sources
and Doctrine of the “Vis Cogitativa” According to St. Thomas Aquinas,
St. Louis 1952; E. Ruth Harvey, The Inward Wit. Psychological Theory
in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, London 1975.
For an idea of the complexity of such a task, see the studies mentioned in
the previous note.
For Suárez’s statement of the plausibility of Thomas’s account, see DA,
VIII.1.13 (vol. III: 28).
For Thomas’s account of the common sense, see Quaestiones de anima, q.
13; Summa theologiae I, q. 78, a. 4. For discussion of his treatment of
the common sense, see E. J. Ryan, The Role of the “Sensus
Communis” in the Psychology of St. Thomas Aquinas, Carthagena,
Ohio 1951, 127-46; R. W. Schmidt, The Unifying Sense: Which?, in:
The New Scholasticism, 57 (1983), 1-12; Francois-Xavier Putallaz, La
sens de la réfexion chez Thomas d’Aquin, Paris 1991, 45-58.
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10. A standard thomistic position. See, for example, Summa theologiae I, q.
84, a. 7. For Thomas’s refusal to call the species in the common sense
a phantasm, see Summa theologiae I, q. 89, a. 5 and Summa Contra
Gentiles, II, c. 73. For helpful discussion of these passages, see
Edward P. Mahoney, Sense, Intellect and Imagination in Albert,
Thomas and Siger, in: Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny and Jan
Pinborg (eds.), The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy,
Cambridge 1982, 607.
11. The central passages for Thomas’s demarcation of the role of the internal
sense powers are Summa theologiae I, q. 78, a. 4 and Quaestiones de
anima, q. 13. R. Brennan (The Thomistic Concept of the Imagination,
in: The New Scholasticism, 15 (1941), 149-61) gives a good
exposition of the various functions of the imagination.
12. Summa theologiae I, q. 85, a. 1, ad 3.
13. DA, VIII.1.1 (vol. III, 14). The most extensive discussion of Suárez’s
account of the internal sense power is Salvador Cubells, Die
Anthropologie des Suárez, Munich 1962, 13745. See also, the brief
remarks in J. M. Alejandro, La gnoseología del Doctor Eximio y la
acusación nominalista, Santander 1948, 227-9.
14. DA, VIII.1.2 (vol. III: 14-16).
15. DA, VIII.1.3 (vol. III: 18).
16. DA, VIII.1.8 (vol. III: 22).
17. DA, VIII.1.9 (vol. III, 22).
18. DA, VIII.1.10 (vol. III, 22-4): “Cogitativa a multis putatur esse potentia
quaedam sensitiva hominis, potens ratiocinari circa particularia et
componere et dividere. Sed haec virtus excedit limites partis sensitivae
. . . Et ideo cogitativa nihil aliud signif cat quam ipsamet potentiam
sensitivam interiorem discernentem inter conveniens et disconveniens,
prout speciali modo in homine existit; et in illo habet maiorem aliquam
perfectionem, quia non tantum ex instinctu naturae ducitur, sed etiam
ex maiori cognitione et experientia, et saepe etiam a ratione dirigitur.”
19. DA, VIII.1.11 (vol. III: 24).
20. DA, VIII.1.12 (vol. III, 24-2): “Quare iudico reminiscentiam potissime fieri
ab intellectu, saltem ad discursum et compositiones, quae illi
admiscentur, quia vero sensus semper comitatur intellectum, ideo
quando intellectus discurrit per diversa loca et tempora, sensus etiam
comitatur, et illa indagatio, que fit in sensu, non per proprium
discursum, sed per quamdam succesionem apprehensionum, ab una in
aliam procedendo, dici potest reminiscentia et operatio sensus,
dependens a praevio discursu intellectus.”
21. Summa theologiae, I, Q. 77, a.3.: “Dicendum quod potentia, secundum
illud quod est potentia, ordinatur ad actum. Unde oportet rationem
potentiae accipi ex actu ad quem ordinatur; et per consequens oportet
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22.

23.

24.

25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

quod ratio potentiae differsif cetur, ut differsificatur ratio actus. Ratio
autem actus diversificatur secundum differsam rationem obiecti.”
In addition to the argument he puts forth against the thesis of a
multiplicity of internal sense powers, Suárez also tries to show that the
authority of Aristotle is on his side. See, for example, DA, VIII.1.21
(vol. III, 40-4). In this assertion, he may in fact be correct. See
Klubertanz 1952 (op.cit., above, n. 6), 24-8.
DA, VIII.1.14 (vol. III, 28-30): “Quarta ergo opinio, quae inter citatas est
probabilior, duplex habet fundamentum: Primum est cognitionem
sensitivam, aliam fieri per species sensatas, aliam per insensatas, et
potentias cognoscentes per illas esse diversas, nam potentiae
cognoscentes per species sensibiles differsarum rationum differsae
sunt. . . .Secundum fundamentum est quod in potentiis sensitivis
potentia cognoscens in praesentia obiecti et in absentia sunt
distinctae. Probatur. Nam potentia cognoscens in praesentia debet
esse facile immutativa et apprehensiva, cognoscens vero potentia in
absentia debet esse conservativa et retentiva specierum; ista autem
duo non possunt convenire eidem potentiae materiali; nam facilis
apprehensio in corporalibus provenit ex humiditate, retentio vero ex
siccitate; quae duo non possunt praedominari in organo eiusdem
potentiae; ergo.” A quick perusal of the major texts of Thomas
Aquinas in which he discusses the four internal sense powers shows
such principles at work. In addition to Summa theologiae I, q. 78, a. 4,
see Quaestio de anima, a. 13; In II De anima, l. 6.
Summa theologiae I, q. 78, a. 4: “Sed necessarium est animali ut quaerat
aliqua vel fugiat, non solum quia sunt convenientia vel non
convenientia ad sentiendum, sed etiam propter aliquas alias
commoditates et utilitates, sive nocumenta; sicut ovis videns lupum
venientem fugit non propter indecentiam coloris vel f gurae, sed quasi
inimicum naturae. . . .Necessarium est ergo animali quod percipiat
huiusmodi intentiones, quas non percipit sensus exterior.”
Summa theologiae I, q. 78, a. 4. For discussion of Avicenna’s view, see
Klubertanz 1952 (op.cit., above, n. 6), 92-7.
DA, VIII.1.17 (vol. III, 34-6)
DA, VIII.1.18 (vol. III, 36)
DA, VI.2.16 (vol. II, 492)
DA, VIII.1.24 (vol. III, 44-6).
Thomas discusses incidental sensation at Sentencia libri De anima, Book
II, lectio 13; De veritate q. 1, a. 11. For Aristotle’s discussion, see De
anima II, 6. W. Bernard (Rezeptivität und Spontaneität der
Wahrnemung bei Aristotles, Baden-Baden 1988, 75-86) argues that
incidental sensation has an intellectual component. He is followed by
Charles Kahn (Aristotle on Thinking, in: Nussbaum-Rorty 1992 (op.cit.,
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31.
32.

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

38.
39.

40.

41.
42.

above, n. 5), 368). For a different view, see S. Cashdollar, Aristotle’s
Account of Incidental Perception, in: Phronesis, 18 (1973), 156-75.
DA, IX.4.6 (vol. III, 160).
Thomas holds that one of the roles of the internal senses is to prepare the
phantasms prior to their illumination and abstraction by the agent
intellect. See the discussion in Klubertanz 1952 (op.cit., above, n. 6),
259 for a list of texts where Thomas discusses this issue.
Summa theologiae I, q. 78, a. 4; Quaestiones de anima a. 13.
DA, VI.2.9 (vol. II, 478).
DA, VI.2.9 (vol. II, 478).
DA, VI.2.9 (vol. II, 480).
DA, VI.2.9 (vol. II, 480-2). Leen Spruit (Species intelligibiles: from
perception to knowledge, 2 vols., Leiden 1994-95, vol. 2, 299) has
some interesting remarks on the centrality of the notion of “attention”
in Suárez’s account of cognition, arguing that it provides him a way to
demarcate effectively the active and passive sides of cognition.
DA, VI.2.10 (vol. II, 482).
DA, VI.2.10 (vol. II, 482): “. . . quod per actionem cognoscendi
producitur quidam intrinsecus terminus illius, qui est qualitas
repraesentativa rei in actu secundo; per hanc ergo qualitatem, quam
sensus exterior in se ipso format, potest probabiliter credi produci in
sensu interiori speciem quamdam repraesentativam eiusdem obiecti. .
. .”
For Suárez’s account of external sensation, see the helpful discussions in
Alejandro 1948 (op.cit., above, n. 13), 219-27; G. Picard, Essai sur la
connaissance sensible d’après les scolastiques, in: Archives de
philosophie, 4 (1926), 1-93; Cubells 1962 (op.cit., above, n. 13), 14355; Allison Simmons, Explaining Sense Perception: A Scholastic
Challenge, in: Philosophical Studies, 73 (1994), 257-75. Suárez’s
account of external sensation can be found at DA, V.5 (vol. II, 368412).
DA, VI.2.11 (vol. II, 484).
DA, VI.2.12 (vol. II, 484): “Respondetur negando primam sequelam, nam
comparatio non recte ft; comparando ergo actum primum unius
potentiae ad actum primum alterius, ille est perfectior, qui est
perfectoris potentiae; et idem est comparando actus secundos inter se.
Tamen comparando actum secundum potentiae minus perfectae ad
actum primum potentiae perfectioris, ille erit perfectior, quia ex suo
genere est in altiori gradu actus constitutus.” For a helpful discussion
of grades of actuality and potentiality in cognition, see Walter M. Neidl,
Der RealitätsbegriV des Franz Suárez nach den “Disputationes
Metaphysicae”, Munich 1966, 12-7.
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43. DA, VI.2.13 (vol. II, 486) While Suárez states that this position is
“probable,” not certain, nonetheless he sees it as the best explanation.
Accordingly, I will simply view it asSuárez’s considered opinion.
44. DA, VI.2.13 (vol. II, 486): “Sensus interior et exterior in eadem anima
radicantur, unde eadem est anima quae videt per visum, et per
imaginationem imaginatur; est ergo haec naturalis consensio inter has
potentias, quod eo ipso quod anima aliquid visu percipit, statim format
similitudinem illius rei in imaginatione sua, non mediante potentia ab
imaginatione distincta, sed per virtutem eiusdem imaginationis, ita ut
posita sensatione extrinsica, naturaliter resultet species in interiori
sensu, non ex activitate sensationis, sed ex activitate ipsius animae
per imaginationem, ad praesentiam tamen rei sensatae.” See also
III.3.21 (vol. II, 148). The most extensive study of the soul’s powers
remains Joseph Ludwig, Das akausale Zusammenwirken (sympathia)
der Seelenvermögen in der Erkenntnislehre des Suárez, Munich 1929.
Ludwig discusses passages throughout Suárez’s writing and shows that
this view of the relation of the soul’s powers has roots in earlier
thinkers, especially those typically classified as “Augustinian.” Spruit
1994-95 (op.cit., above, n. 38), 302 recognizes that in addition to
speaking of a kind of “sympathy” or “harmony” between the soul’s
powers, Suárez also talks of a common “root” that can explain this
harmony. Spruit finds this a melding together of ideas taken from John
Peter Olivi (sympathy) and Giles of Rome (rooting of powers in the
same soul). I take it that in fact these metaphors point to the same
general point: there is no causal interaction between the soul’s
powers. Consequently, the soul itself must play some role in the
activities of these various sense powers.
45. DA, II.3.10 (vol. 1, 174).
46. For the materiality of the phantasm, see DA, IX.2.2 (vol. III, 78), where
Suárez states bluntly that “the phantasm is material” (“phantasma
autem materiale est”).
47. DA, IX.2.3 (vol. III, 82). For discussion about the role of the agent
intellect, see Alejandro 1948 (op.cit., above, n. 13), 329-33; Cubells
1962 (op.cit., above, n. 13), 190-3; Spruit 1994-95 (op.cit., above, n.
37), vol. II, 301-5.
48. DA, IX.2.4 (vol. III, 82).
49. DA, IX.2.11 (vol. III, 94).
50. DA, IX.2.12 (vol. III, 94).
51. DA, IX.7.6 (vol. III, 202): “Anima dum est in corpore habet intrinsecam
dependentiam a phantasia, id est, non potest per intellectum operari
nisi simul actu operetur per phantasma. . . . Non quod ipsa
phantasmata intelligantur, id est, cognoscantur, sed quod per illa
phantasia simul operetur cum intellectu.”
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52. DA, IX.2.12 (vol. III, 96).
53. DA, IX.2.11 (vol. III, 94): “Intellectus agens numquam eYcit species nisi
a phantasiae cognitione determinetur. . . . Ratio autem esse potest,
nam intellectus agens est indifferens ad efficiendas omnes species, et
ideo, ut efficiat has vel illas indiget aliquo determinante; nihil est
autem aliud a quo possit determinari nisi a phantasiae cognitione;
ergo.”
54. DA, IX.2.12 (Vol. III, 96).
55. DA, IX.2.13 (Vol. III, 98): “Dicitur quod in potentiis animae est alius
modus determinationis inquantum una potentia praeparat materiam
alteri, vel inquantum actio unius potentiae habet necessariam
connexionem cum actione alterius.”
56. DA, IX.2.12 (vol. III, 96).
57. DA, VI.2.16 (vol. II, 492-4): “Ad auctoritatem vero negativam Aristotelis,
quia hoc numquam dixit, respondetur quod multa etiam alia non dixit
neque exacte tractavit. Verum est quod D. Thomas, I p., q. 79, a. 3,
ad 1, videtur hanc activitatem specierum denegare omnibus sensibus.
Sed forte loquitur de sensibus quantum ad primam receptionem
specierum, quae ft ab obiecto, ex qua oritur cuiuscumque alterius
speciei productio.” Thomas, in the passage cited, states: “Sensible
things are found in act outside the soul; and hence there is so need for
an agent sense. Therefore it is clear that, in the nutritive part, all the
powers are active, whereas in the sensitive part all are passive, but in
the intellectual part, there is something active and something passive.”
[“Dicendum quod sensibilia inveniuntur actu extra animam; et ideo
non oportuit ponere sensum agentem. Et sic patet quod in parte
nutritiva omnes potentiae sunt activae; in parte autem sensitiva,
omnes passivae; in parte vero intellectiva est aliquid activum, et
aliquid passivum.”] Thomas is clear in this passage and Suárez’s
attempt to read something else into what Thomas says is an indication
of the real distance between the two views.
58. He discusses the view of Aristotle and Thomas at DA, IX.8.16 (vol. III,
232-4) and the view of Averroes at DA, IX.8.3 (vol. III, 214).
59. DA, IX.8.17 (vol. III, 234). For Nifo on the denial of a real distinction
between agent and potential intelllects in the rational soul, see
Augustini Niphi Suessani philosophi in via Aristotelis De intellectu libri
sex, Venice 1554, IV, f. 35 v. For discussion, see Edward P. Mahoney,
Pier Nicola Castellani and Agostino Nifo on Averroes’ Doctrine of the
Agent Intellect, in: Rivista Critica di Storia della Filosof a, 25 (1970),
400-3; id., Agostino Nifo and Saint Thomas Aquinas, in: Memorie
Domenicane, 7 (1976), 210-1.
60. DA, IX.8.18 (vol. III, 234-6): “Angelicus enim intellectus ex natura sua
habet inditas species omnium rerum, quae quasi dimanant a virtutute
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61.
62.
63.

64.

65.
66.

67.

68.

propria intellectus, quasi passiones ab essentia; potentia autem
sensitiva, maxime exteriores et speciebus carent et illas ab extrinscis
obiectis recipiunt; intellectus autem noster et ex natura sua speciebus
caret—in quo et a perfectione angeli declinat—, habet tamen
convenientiam aliquam cum illo, scilicet quod statim ac anima nostra
cognoscit per phantasiam rem aliquam, dimanat ab ipso intellectu
species repraesentans rem illam. Unde haec efficientia potius est per
modum cuiusdam emanationis speciei ab intellectu, et ita non est
potentia distincta illa efficientia.”
DA, IX.8.18 (vol. III, 236).
DA, III.1.21 (vol. II, 78-80).
Previous scholars have been split on the whether Suárez’s account
amounts to a version of innatism, Nigel Abercrombie (Saint Augustine
and French Classical Thought, New York 1972 [reprint of the 1938
edition], 82) states that Suárez is clearly committed to a form of
innatism. See also, Ludwig 1929 (op.cit., above, n. 44), 56-7 who
comments on the passage cited in note 60. Spruit 1994-95 (op.cit.,
above, n. 37), vol. II, 304 rejects any innatism in Suárez. However,
Spruit appears to miss the fact that the crucial passage discussed by
Ludwig is not just about angelic cognition, but also about the human
intellect. Alejandro 1948 (op.cit., above, n. 13), 186-8, speaks only of
a “dynamic power” (potencia dinámica) and an “innate force” ( fuerza
ingénita).
For different varieties of “innatism” see the helpful remarks in Dominic
Scott, Recollection and Experience: Plato’s Theory of Learning and its
Successors, Cambridge 1995, 91-5.
DA, IX.2.2 (vol. III, 80).
Comments on a Certain Broadsheet, in: The Philosophical Writings of
Descartes, tr. John Cottingham, Robert StoothoV and Dugald Murdoch,
Cambridge 1985, vol. 1, 304 (=Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. C. Adam
and P. Tannery, Paris 1964-76), vol. VIII B, 358-9. Abercrombie 1972
[1938] (op.cit., above, n. 63), 86 suggests that Suárez’s version of
“occasionalism” is considerably less vague than Descartes’s. For
additional discussion of this passage in Descartes, see Scott 1995
(op.cit., above, n. 64), 91-6.
DA, III.3.14 (vol. II, 136): “Forma non est activa nisi actione naturaliter
resultanti ex illa; quae dicitur dimanatio, nam dimanatio effectiva sine
actione diYcile intelligitur. Et similiter dicitur quod idem non agit in se,
nisi isto genere actionis, scilicet, per resultantiam, vel certe quod non
agit, nisi ut virtus generantis.”
DA, V.4.16 (vol. II, 366). Picard 1926 (op.cit., above, n. 40), 38-41,
Alejandro 1948 (op.cit., above, n. 13), 196-9 and Cubells 1962
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69.
70.
71.
72.

(op.cit., above, n. 13), 112-7 all correctly stress the instrumentality of
the species in the context of the immanent process of cognition.
See quote above, note 59.
DA, IX.8.18 (vol. III, 234-6).
Summa theologiae I, q. 85, a. 1.
DA, IX.3 (vol. III, 106-52).
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